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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Robert Conrad MacNeilage appeals from the judgment entered upon the 
jury verdicts finding him guilty of two counts of insurance fraud.  MacNeilage 
complains that the district court (1) abused its discretion in its I.R.E. 609 
evidentiary ruling; (2) imposed an excessive sentence; and (3) abused its 
discretion in relinquishing jurisdiction. 
 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
 
 The state charged MacNeilage with four counts of insurance fraud.  (R., 
pp.17-19, 32-33.1)  A jury convicted MacNeilage of two of the four counts, but 
could not reach an agreement as to the other two counts.  (R., pp.55-56; Trial Tr., 
p.450, L.9 – p.452, L.24.)  After the state indicated it did not intend to pursue the 
two counts on which the jury could not agree, the court dismissed those counts 
without prejudice.  (R., pp.58-59.)  The court imposed concurrent unified six-year 
sentences, with two years fixed, and retained jurisdiction.  (R., pp.68-69.)  At the 
end of the review period, the court relinquished jurisdiction.  (R., p.83.)  
MacNeilage timely appealed.  (R., pp.72-74, 96-99.)   
 
                                                 
1 All page references to the Clerk’s Record are to the page numbers associated 
with the electronic file, “Clerk’s Record.pdf,” as opposed to the page numbers 




 MacNeilage states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err when it prohibited Mr. Macneilage 
from questioning the State’s witnesses on the substance of 
their past felony convictions pursuant to I.R.E. 609? 
 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion by sentencing Mr. 
Macneilage excessively? 
 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion in relinquishing 
jurisdiction over Mr. Macneilage? 
 
(Appellant’s Brief, p.6.)  
 
 The state rephrases the issues as: 
 
1. Has MacNeilage failed to establish the district court committed evidentiary 
error in only allowing him to impeach two witnesses with the fact of a prior felony 
conviction, but not the nature of the conviction? 
 
2. Has MacNeilage failed to establish his sentences are excessive or that the 








MacNeilage Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Only 
Allowing Him To Impeach Two Witnesses With The Fact Of A Prior Felony 




MacNeilage asserts the district court abused its discretion by only allowing 
him the opportunity to impeach two witnesses – Richard Gibson and Justin 
Hansen – with the fact of a prior felony conviction, but not the nature of the 
conviction.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.7-11.)  Application of the correct legal 
standards demonstrates MacNeilage has failed to show the district court erred in 
its evidentiary ruling.   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
The trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence, and its 
judgment will be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of discretion.  
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 218, 245 P.3d 961, 970 (2010) (citations omitted).  
Relevance of a prior conviction is a question of law reviewed de novo while the 
prejudicial impact of such evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  State 
v. Thompson, 132 Idaho 628, 630, 977 P.2d 890, 892 (1999) (citing State v. 
Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 766, 864 P.2d 596, 604 (1993)). 
 
C. MacNeilage Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Exclusion Of 
Evidence Of The Nature Of Hansen’s And Gibson’s Prior Felony 
Convictions 
 
Rule 609(a), I.R.E., provides, in relevant part: 
 4 
 
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence of 
the fact that the witness has been convicted of a felony and the 
nature of the felony shall be admitted if elicited from the witness or 
established by public record, but only if the court determines in a 
hearing outside the presence of the jury that the fact of the prior 
conviction or the nature of the prior conviction, or both, are relevant 
to the credibility of the witness and that the probative value of 
admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the party 
offering the witness. 
 
Thus, under I.R.E. 609, a trial court may admit the fact of conviction, the 
nature of the conviction, or both.  I.R.E. 609(a).  In deciding whether a prior 
felony conviction is admissible under I.R.E. 609, a district court “must apply a 
two-prong test.”  State v. Thompson, 132 Idaho 628, 630, 977 P.2d 890, 892 
(1999).  First, “the court must determine whether the fact or nature of the 
conviction is relevant to the witness’ credibility.”  Id. (emphasis added).  Second, 
“the court must determine whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs 
its prejudicial effect.”  Id.  With respect to the first prong, the Idaho Supreme 
Court has stated that “different felonies have different degrees of probative value 
on the issue of credibility.  Some, such as perjury, are intimately connected with 
that issue; others, such as robbery and burglary, are somewhat less relevant; 
and [a]cts of violence . . . generally have little or no direct bearing on honesty and 
veracity.”  State v. Ybarra, 102 Idaho 573, 580-581, 634 P.2d 435, 442-443 
(1981) (quoting People v. Rollo, 569 P.2d 771, 775 (1977)) (alteration added, 
ellipses original).  The Court has further stated that “[t]he determination whether 
evidence of a particular felony conviction is relevant to credibility depends on the 
particular facts and circumstances of each case and must therefore be decided 
on a case-by-case basis.”  State v. Bush, 131 Idaho 22, 31, 951 P.2d 1249, 1258 
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(1997).  The case-by-case analysis referred to in Bush requires an “examination 
of the statute under which the conviction occurred” in order to determine into 
which category the conviction falls, rather than “a record to be made of the 
circumstances supporting conviction of the prior offense.”  State v. Muraco, 132 
Idaho 130, 133, 968 P.2d 225, 228 (1998).  Application of the foregoing 
standards to the record in this case shows that MacNeilage has failed to show 
error in the district court’s limitation on the evidence of the witnesses’ prior 
convictions to the fact of conviction without reference to the nature of the 
convictions.   
MacNeilage waited until the third day of trial, just prior to Gibson and 
Hansen testifying, to advise the court he had a “609 issue on Justin Hansen” and 
that Gibson “also has a felony criminal history involving possession of a stolen 
credit card, as well as possession of meth.”  (Trial Tr., p.253, Ls.23-25 (Hansen), 
p.257, Ls.19-21 (Gibson).)  The parties then engaged in the following discussion 
as to Hansen: 
 THE COURT:  Where is your 609 hearing before trial as 
required by the rule?   
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Well, Your Honor, I’m asking for 
that hearing right now.  I don’t know what else to say about the 
conviction.  It stands.  It’s clearly within the grasp of the 609 rule, 
and it’s clearly a felony that -- conviction that reflects upon the 
credibility of the witness.  
  
THE COURT:  Well, [Madam Prosecutor]. 
 
[PROSECUTOR]:  Your Honor.  Mr. Hansen does make -- 
did make statements to -- to the investigators that he didn’t want 
any trouble because, at the time, he was on probation.  That’s 




I don’t know that it’s necessary to -- to mention “felony 
probation” or what the charge was, based on the lack of a hearing 
on 609 issues.  But that’s certainly is -- we will hear that he was on 
probation.   
  
THE COURT:  Well – 
 
[PROSECUTOR]:  That won’t be a secret.   
        
(Tr., p.254, Ls.1-20.)  The court then ruled that, “based upon what [it] heard,” it 
would “allow reference to the fact that [Hansen] has been convicted of a felony,” 
but would “not allow reference to the nature of the felony” since the court did not 
think “burglary is a crime of moral turpitude” such that “the nature of the crime” 
should be “mention[ed],” particularly since “burglary is such a common crime, 
and there are so many ways to commit it.”  (Tr., p.254, L.21 – p.255, L.3, p.256, 
Ls.11-24.)    
With respect to Gibson, MacNeilage advised the court that Gibson “has a 
felony criminal history involving possession of a stolen credit card, as well as 
possession of meth.”  (Tr., p.257, Ls.16-21.)  The court again expressed concern 
that MacNeilage was raising the issue in the middle of trial given that I.R.E. 609 
is “designed” to address such issues prior to trial so the court could “get the 
evidence of the convictions” and “deal with them.”  (Tr., p.257, L.24 – p.258, L.2.)  
In response, the state indicated that Gibson “was convicted of a theft of a credit 
card” and asserted that the methamphetamine charge “is not a crime of moral 
turpitude.”  (Tr., p.258, Ls.3-6.)  The court ruled that, as with Hansen’s prior 
conviction, it would allow reference to the fact of Gibson’s conviction, but not the 
nature of the conviction.  (Tr., p.258, Ls.12-13.)  Despite the court’s ruling, 
MacNeilage did not ask Gibson or Hansen if they had been convicted of a felony. 
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 On appeal, MacNeilage complains the district court erred in denying his 
“motion” to “use the nature” of Gibson’s and Hansen’s prior convictions.  
(Appellant’s Brief, p.9.)  More specifically, MacNeilage contends the district court 
erred because, he argues, the court failed to make the two-part determination 
required by I.R.E. 609.  (Appellant’s Brief, p.9.)  MacNeilage further asserts that, 
applying the correct analysis, evidence of the nature of the convictions was 
admissible.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.10-11.)  MacNeilage’s arguments fail.   
 As an initial matter, the record reflects that MacNeilage did not actually 
present any argument to the district court as to why he believed the nature of 
Gibson’s and Hansen’s prior convictions was admissible.  Instead, MacNeilage 
merely noted what the convictions were for without ever explaining why the 
nature of the convictions was relevant to credibility.  (See Tr., p.254, Ls.3-8, 
p.257, Ls.16-22.)  The closest MacNeilage came to presenting any argument 
supporting a request to present the nature of the felonies was in relation to 
Hansen’s conviction for burglary when MacNeilage said:  “I don’t know what else 
to say about the conviction.  It stands.  It’s clearly within the grasp of the 609 rule, 
and it’s clearly a felony that -- conviction that reflects upon the credibility of the 
witness.”  (Tr., p.254, Ls.4-8.)  MacNeilage said nothing about the relevance of 
the nature of Gibson’s conviction, he only referenced its existence.  (Tr., p.257, 
Ls.19-21.)  To the extent MacNeilage’s appellate arguments regarding the 
relevance of the nature of the convictions are not preserved, this Court should 
decline to consider them.  McLean v. Cheyovich Family Trust, 153 Idaho 425, 
 8 
 
430, 283 P.3d 742, 747 (2012) (citation omitted) (“This Court will not consider 
arguments raised for the first time on appeal.”).     
 In addition to only providing a conclusory request to question Hansen and 
Gibson about their prior felony convictions, MacNeilage failed to develop a record 
adequate to support his claim that he was entitled to examine the witnesses on 
the nature of their convictions.  The Court of Appeals’ opinion in State v. Grist, 
152 Idaho 786, 275 P.3d 12 (Ct. App. 2012), is illustrative.  In Grist, the Court of 
Appeals noted that, “[w]ith respect to the first prong of the Rule 609(a) inquiry, 
theft is a crime like robbery and burglary and, therefore, is less relevant to 
credibility because it does not deal directly with veracity and has only a general 
relationship with dishonesty.”  Grist, 152 Idaho at 791, 275 P.3d at 17.  Because 
Grist “offered no evidence that the statute under which the witness was convicted 
included an element of fraud or deceit,” the Court of Appeals “agree[d] with the 
district court’s conclusion that evidence of the witness’s felony theft conviction 
was minimally relevant for impeachment purposes.”  Id.  The same is true in 
MacNeilage’s case; MacNeilage “offered no evidence that the statute[s] under 
which” either Hansen or Gibson were “convicted included an element of fraud or 
deceit.”  Given the lack of any such evidence, the district court could have 
excluded evidence of the convictions altogether.  At best, Gibson’s and Hansen’s 
convictions were only “minimally relevant for impeachment purposes.”  See, e.g., 
United States v. Givens, 767 F.2d 574, 579 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (“Generally, crimes 
of violence, theft crimes, and crimes of stealth do not involve dishonest or false 
statement within the meaning of [F.R.E.] 609(a)(2). . . .  While a theft conviction 
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may be admissible under Rule 609(a)(2) if the crime was actually committed by 
fraudulent or deceitful means, the government has not demonstrated that either 
of Givens’ prior convictions involved fraud or deceit.”) (citation omitted); United 
States v. Yeo, 739 F.2d 385, 387-388 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding, “in accord with the 
majority of circuits that have considered the issue,” “theft is not a crime involving 
dishonesty or false statement within the meaning of Rule 609(a)(2),” but 
observing that “although theft is not, of necessity, a crime of dishonesty or false 
statement, it may nevertheless be admissible under Rule 609(a)(2) if in fact the 
crime was committed by fraudulent or deceitful means”) (citing cases from other 
circuits, quotations omitted); United States v. Glenn, 667 F.2d 1269, 1273 (9th 
Cir. 1982) (although theft crimes “may indicate a lack of respect for the persons 
or property of others, they do not bear directly on the likelihood that the 
defendant will testify truthfully”; such crimes may “nevertheless be admissible 
under rule 609(a)(2) if the crime was actually committed by fraudulent or deceitful 
means”) (citations and quotations omitted).2   
With respect to the second prong of the I.R.E. 609 analysis, several 
factors may be considered when weighing the probative value of a prior felony 
                                                 
2 Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(2) states: “evidence that any witness has been 
convicted of a crime shall be admitted regardless of the punishment, if it readily 
can be determined that establishing the elements of the crime required proof or 
admission of an act of dishonesty or false statement by the witness.”  Although 
F.R.E. 609(a)(2) includes language requiring “an act of dishonesty or false 
statement by the witness” that is not present in I.R.E. 609(a), in light of the 
framework established in Ybarra requiring consideration of the nature of the 
conviction in determining its relevancy to credibility, the federal courts’ 
interpretation of F.R.E. 609(a)(2) is instructive on this point.   
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conviction against its potential prejudicial effect.  Grist, 152 Idaho at 790, 275 
P.3d at 16.  Those factors include: 
(1) the impeachment value of the prior crime; (2) the remoteness of 
the prior conviction; (3) the witness’s criminal history; (4) the 
similarity between the past crime and the crime charged; (5) the 
importance of the witness’s testimony; (6) the centrality of the 
credibility issue; and (7) the nature and extent of the witness’s 
criminal record as a whole.3 
 
Id. (citing State v. Rodgers, 119 Idaho 1047, 1073, 812 P.2d 1208, 1234 (1991)).  
MacNeilage presented no information regarding the dates of Gibson’s or 
Hansen’s convictions,4 either witness’s criminal history, or the nature and extent 
of their criminal record.  As for credibility, the central issue in this case was 
whether MacNeilage purposefully wrecked his car in order to collect the 
insurance money, or whether it was, as he claimed, an accident.  Gibson and 
                                                 
3 These factors are similar to those used by federal courts applying F.R.E. 609.  
See Givens, 767 F.2d at 579 n.2 (the five factors considered in federal court in 
assessing the probative value of a conviction against its prejudicial effect are (1) 
“[t]he impeachment value of the prior crime;” (2) “[t]he point in time of the 
conviction and the witness’ subsequent history;” (3) “[t]he similarity between the 
past crime and the charged crime;” (4) “[t]he importance of the defendant’s 
testimony;” and (5) “[t]he centrality of the credibility issue”).   
 
4 With respect to dates, MacNeilage told the court that Gibson “has a felony 
criminal history involving possession of a stolen credit card, as well as 
possession of meth, and was, I think, at the time actually on parole.”  (Tr., p.257, 
Ls.19-22.)  The prosecutor subsequently advised the court that Gibson indicated 
“he was not on parole at the time, but he did have a conviction approximately 
seven years ago.”  (Tr., p.258, Ls.6-8.)  However, it is unclear which conviction 
was “approximately seven years ago.”  To the extent it was the 
methamphetamine conviction, MacNeilage is not claiming that he should have 
been allowed to introduce evidence of that conviction; he only claims the district 
court erred by not allowing him to present evidence of Gibson’s “conviction for 
theft of a credit card or possession of a stolen credit card.”  (Appellant’s Brief, 
p.11 (emphasis added).)  Notably, MacNeilage’s argument indicates he is unsure 
of what Gibson’s conviction even was, which seems problematic for his claim that 
he should have been allowed to impeach Gibson with the nature of the 
conviction.   
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Hansen both testified to statements MacNeilage made that supported the 
conclusion MacNeilage wrecked the car intentionally.  (Tr., p.262, Ls.5-23 
(Gibson testifying that MacNeilage asked if he “would mind steering the vehicle 
as he was towing it into a tree”); p.264, Ls.10-22 (Gibson testifying that 
MacNeilage offered him money to help him steer the car into a tree); p.270, L.24 
– p.271, L.8 (Hansen testifying that MacNeilage “jokingly” said, “‘Hey, we need to 
wreck this BMW so I can get out from underneath it’”).)  However, other 
witnesses offered similar testimony.  (Tr., p.123, L.17 – p.124, L.2 (Ronald 
Gibson testifying that one of the scenarios discussed with MacNeilage was “tying 
a rope to the back of his truck and to the front of the car, and then pulling it and 
steering it into a tree and jumping in – or jumping out at the last minute before it 
hit the tree”); p.244, Ls.10-24 (Clint Lish testifying he overheard a conversation 
between MacNeilage and another man in which MacNeilage said, “in kind of a 
joking fashion,” about “maybe getting rid of the vehicle” because “[i]t was worth 
more to him in insurance, at that point, than it was to have the vehicle”).)   
There was also testimony that was even more damaging than the 
testimony, like that offered by Gibson and Hansen, about MacNeilage’s 
incriminatory statements prior to the wreck.  That evidence included testimony 
from an eyewitness who was with MacNeilage when he wrecked the car, and 
testimony from an individual to whom MacNeilage admitted he intentionally 
wrecked the car.  (Tr., p.129, L.2 – p.130, L.21, p.177, L.8 – p.184, L.6.)  Thus, 
while credibility may have been an issue in terms of which theory the jury 
believed – MacNeilage’s or the state’s – the state’s case did not hinge on the 
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credibility of Gibson or Hansen, individually or in combination.  Moreover, nothing 
in the record supports the conclusion that Gibson or Hansen would gain any 
advantage by testifying falsely.  Compare State v. Bush, 131 Idaho 22, 31, 951 
P.2d 1249, 1258 (1997) (“Since Bush had no compunction against engaging in 
immoral acts with a minor, there is no reason to believe that he would hesitate to 
gain an advantage for himself in this case by giving false testimony.”).  The 
district court correctly weighed the probative value of the evidence of Gibson’s 
and Hansen’s prior felony convictions against the potential prejudice and did not 
abuse its discretion by only allowing MacNeilage to inquire into the fact of 
conviction, but not the nature of the conviction.5       
 MacNeilage has failed to show error in the district court’s decision to limit 
MacNeilage’s inquiry of Gibson and Hansen to the fact of conviction without 
reference to the nature of the conviction.   
 
                                                 
5 MacNeilage contends the district court did not apply the two-part test required 
under the I.R.E. 609 analysis.  (Appellant’s Brief, p.10.)  While the district court 
identified the first prong of the analysis as requiring a determination that the 
witness has “been convicted of a felony,” rather than whether the fact or nature of 
the conviction was relevant to credibility, a determination that a conviction 
actually exists is also necessary to the analysis because, without such a finding, 
further analysis would not be required.  Moreover, the district court’s description 
of the second step of the analysis – whether “the nature of the felony” reflects 
upon credibility (Tr., p.256, Ls.19-22) – fairly encompasses both prongs of the 
applicable legal test, and the record supports the conclusion that the district court 
was aware there was both a relevance and a prejudice component to its 
decision, even if it did not articulate the test in precisely the same language used 
in appellate decisions (Tr., p.256, Ls.2-6 (referencing prejudice and relevance)).      
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D. Even If The District Court Erred In Not Allowing MacNeilage To Cross-
Examine Gibson And Hansen Regarding The Nature Of Their Theft 
Convictions, The Error Was Harmless 
 
Even if this Court concludes that the district court erred in not allowing 
MacNeilage to cross-examine Gibson and Hansen regarding the nature of their 
theft convictions, any error was harmless.  Idaho Criminal Rule 52 provides that 
“[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial 
rights shall be disregarded.”  Error is harmless when there is no reasonable 
possibility that the error contributed to the jury’s verdict and the Court can 
“declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”  State v. 
Fernandez, 124 Idaho 381, 383-84, 859 P.2d 1389, 1391-92 (1993) (citations 
omitted).  
As previously noted, other witnesses provided testimony similar to 
Gibson’s and Hansen’s and two witnesses provided testimony more directly 
implicating MacNeilage in the crimes alleged.  Most notably, one witness, Tanner 
Myers, testified that he was with MacNeilage when MacNeilage intentionally 
wrecked the car.  (Tr., p.177, L.8 – p.184, L.6.)  Further, it is unclear how 
impeaching Gibson and Hansen with the nature of their prior felony convictions 
would be any more valuable than impeaching them with the fact of their 
conviction.  Indeed, MacNeilage did not even bother to ask either Gibson or 
Hansen about their conviction, so it is unclear why he believes it is reversible 
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error that he was not allowed to ask them about the nature of their convictions.6  
(See generally Tr., p.264, L.8 – p.266, L.5 (cross-examination of Gibson); p.272, 
Ls.5-21 (cross-examination of Hansen). 
Based on the evidence presented, this Court can easily conclude that any 
error in the district court’s I.R.E. 609 ruling did not contribute to the jury’s verdict 
and it can “declare a belief that [the error alleged by MacNeilage] was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Fernandez, supra.     
 
II. 
MacNeilage Has Failed To Establish His Sentences Are Excessive Or That The 
District Court Abused Its Discretion By Relinquishing Jurisdiction 
 
A. Introduction 
 MacNeilage asserts “his aggregate unified sentence of six years, with two 
years fixed, is excessive” “[i]n light of the mitigating factors present in this case.”   
(Appellant’s Brief, pp.11-12.)  MacNeilage also contends the district court abused 
its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.13-14.)  
Application of the law to the facts shows that both of MacNeilage’s sentencing 
arguments fail.   
 
                                                 
6 Although Hansen volunteered during direct examination that he was “on felony 
probation” when MacNeilage asked him to help wreck the car, and that was the 
reason he told MacNeilage, “no” (Tr., p.271, Ls.4-10), MacNeilage did not follow-
up on this testimony in cross-examination or otherwise inquire about the fact of 
Hansen’s conviction (see generally Tr., p.264, L.8 – p.266, L.5).  In any event, 
any inquiry into the nature of the offense that resulted in Hansen’s felony 
conviction (and probation) would not have added anything of value for purposes 
of impeaching Hansen’s credibility.     
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B. Standard Of Review 
 
 A district court’s sentence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  State v. 
Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 27, 218 P.3d 5, 7 (Ct. App. 2009).  The decision to 
relinquish jurisdiction is also reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  State v. 
Latneau, 154 Idaho 165, 166, 296 P.3d 371, 372 (2013).     
  
C. The District Court Acted Well Within Its Sentencing Discretion In Imposing 
Sentence And In Relinquishing Jurisdiction 
  
1. MacNeilage’s Sentences Are Not Excessive 
The court imposed concurrent unified six-year sentences, with two years 
fixed, upon the jury’s verdicts finding MacNeilage guilty of two counts of 
insurance fraud.  (R., pp.68-69.)  MacNeilage claims these sentences are 
excessive “[i]n light of the mitigating factors present in this case.”  (Appellant’s 
Brief, p.12.)  More specifically, MacNeilage argues his “strong support from 
family and members of the community” is “[a]n important fact that should have 
received the attention of the district court.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.12.)  MacNeilage 
also cites his “good work history” as a mitigating factor.  (Appellant’s Brief, p.13.)  
Neither of MacNeilage’s arguments support his claim that his sentences are 
excessive.     
In order to demonstrate an abuse of the district court’s sentencing 
discretion, MacNeilage must “establish that, under any reasonable view of the 
facts, the sentence was excessive considering the objectives of criminal 
punishment.”  State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 933, 104 P.3d 969, 975 (2005).  
Those objectives are: “(1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual 
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and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment 
or retribution for wrong doing.”  State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384, 582 P.2d 728, 
730 (1978).  The district court cited these objectives (Tr., p.487, Ls.4-11) prior to 
imposing sentence, but found that “[b]ased upon all of the circumstances of the 
case,” an aggregate six-year sentence, with two years fixed, was appropriate 
(Tr., p.487, Ls.16-21).  This sentence is well within the 15-year statutory 
maximum authorized by law.  I.C. § 41-293(4).  That MacNeilage believes his 
family and community support and his work history should have received extra 
attention falls far short of showing the district court abused its discretion.   
Given all of the information available to the district court when it imposed 
sentence, MacNeilage has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that, under 
any reasonable view of the facts, his sentences are excessive. 
 
2. MacNeilage Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its 
Discretion By Relinquishing Jurisdiction 
 
MacNeilage next “contends the district court abused its discretion in 
relinquishing jurisdiction in light of his limited successes during his period of 
retained jurisdiction and his desire to make change in his life.”  (Appellant’s Brief, 
p.14.)  The record and the law support the district court’s decision to relinquish 
jurisdiction.  
A district court properly exercises its discretion to relinquish jurisdiction so 
long as it “(1) correctly perceives the issue to be one of discretion, (2) acts within 
the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards 
applicable to the specific choices available to it, and (3) reaches its decision by 
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an exercise of reason.”  Latneau, 154 Idaho at 166, 296 P.3d at 372 (citing State 
v. Cobler, 148 Idaho 769, 771, 229 P.3d 374, 376 (2010)).    
In deciding to relinquish jurisdiction, the district court “received and 
considered” the “recommendation of the Classification Committee.”  (R., p.83.)  
The recommendation was that the district court relinquish jurisdiction because 
MacNeilage (1) “appear[ed] to continue using criminal and/or addictive thinking 
patterns, attitudes, and beliefs”; (2) “ha[d] not demonstrated, through [his] 
behavior and performance at NICI, that [he was] an appropriate candidate for 
probation”; and (3) did “not appear to be willing to take an honest look at [his] 
criminal behavior, beliefs or attitudes, and [he] continue[d] to pose a significant 
risk to reoffend if released back into the community at [that] time.”  (APSI, p.9.)  
That recommendation was reflective of MacNeilage’s behavior during the 
retained jurisdiction program, which included a formal disciplinary sanction and 
numerous informal sanctions.  (APSI, pp.3-4.)  That MacNeilage believes the 
court should have disregarded that information and “recognize[d] that [his] 
accomplishments while on the retained jurisdiction would equate to a successful 
probation” (Appellant’s Brief, p.14), does not demonstrate that the district court 
did not act within the boundaries of its discretion by disagreeing with MacNeilage.   






 The state requests this Court affirm MacNeilage’s convictions and 
sentences for two counts of insurance fraud. 
DATED this 29th day of July, 2016. 
 
      /s/ Jessica M. Lorello_______________ 
      JESSICA M. LORELLO 
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